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NOTES
THE INSURANCE PROBLEM IN
ASBESTOSIS LITIGATION: A CASE FOR
THE MANIFESTATION THEORY
Exposure to the materials and methods of this country's ad-
vanced technology has infected and disabled an alarming number
of workers, consumers and bystanders.1 Typically, personal injury
arises as a result of exposure to some deleterious substance in the
occupational setting,2 although problems from insidious3 diseases
have also been uncovered in the medical setting as a result of in-
gestion of certain drugs,4 most notably Diethylstilbestrol (DES). 5
Undoubtedly, the full complement of medically and environmen-
I See infra note 7. Although typical latent disease cases involve injuries suffered by
workers exposed to some harmful agent, see infra note 2 and accompanying text, it should
be noted at the outset that the problem also encompasses users of products, Mehaffy, As-
bestos Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 351 (1980), and bystanders who may be ex-
posed, including members of a worker's family and the public at large. 3 C. Tansca, E.
ECKERT & L. TEDESCHi, FORENSIC MEDICINE 1279 (1977) [hereinafter cited as C. TEDESCHI];
Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860, 861 (1980);
Mehaffy, supra, at 350-51; Vagley & Blanton, Aggregation of Claims: Liability For Certain
Illnesses with Long Latency Periods Before Manifestation, 16 FORUM 636, 637 (1981); Win-
ter, Asbestos Legal 'Tidal Wave' Is Closing In, 68 A.B.A. J. 397, 398 (1982).
2 See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 6 (1976) (coal dust); Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 166 (1949) (silica dust); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076, 1081-82 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestos), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
' The term "insidious" has been described as denoting a disease that "progresses with
few or no symptoms to indicate its gravity." Comment, Liability Insurance For Insidious
Disease: Who Picks Up the Tab? 48 FORDHAm L. REv. 657, 657 n.1 (1980) (quoting
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 711 (4th unabr. lawyers' ed. 1976)). For the purpose of this
Note, the terms "latent disease" and "insidious disease" will be used interchangeably.
4 See, e.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 568 (3d Cir. 1976) (estrogen
compound), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal.
App. 2d 689, 694, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403 (Ct. App. 1967) (MER/29 (cholesterol inhibitor));
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 381, 528 P.2d 522, 526 (1974) (oral
contraceptive).
' See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 935, 936 (E.D. Pa.
1980); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d 222, 222, 406
N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); infra note 58.
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tally triggered diseases has yet to be comprehended.'
Perhaps the most currently significant of the insidious dis-
eases is asbestosis. Indeed, the tremendous number of people af-
fected by the disease7 has sparked an overwhelming amount of liti-
gation.8 At the root of the problems surrounding asbestosis
litigation is the disease's extremely long period of latency.9 This
latency has resulted in a conflict among the courts as to whether
insurers' liability attaches at the point of exposure to the disease-
causing substance or at the time of the disease's manifestation.10
The liability of particular insurers often hinges on resolution of
' Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 639. The potential claims for damages arising in
the insidious disease context are virtually limitless. See Mansfield, supra note 1, at 875;
Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 351; Rosow & Liederman, An Overview to the Interpretive
Problems of "Occurrence" in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance, 16 FORUM 1148,
1152 (1981). Likely areas of future latent disease litigation include claims for damages re-
sulting from: (1) radiation, see, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3d Cir.
1981); Yannon v. New York Tel. Co., 86 App. Div. 2d 241, 243, 450 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (3d
Dep't 1982) (microwaves); Rosow & Liederman, supra, at 1152, (2) pollution and toxic
waste, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH 28-29 (1981) [herein-
after cited as ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH]; Rosow & Liederman, supra, at 1152; and (3)
Agent Orange, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); see ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH, supra, at 31-33; Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at
639.
, Workers in at least 14 industries have been exposed to asbestos. Vagley & Blanton,
supra note 1, at 637. It has been estimated that approximately 9 million exposed workers
are now alive. Winter, supra note 1, at 398 (discussing interview with Dr. Irving Selikoff,
director of the Environmental Sciences Laboratory at Mt. Sinai School of Medicine); see
Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 647. It is predicted that 20,000 people will die annually
in the United States from asbestos-related disease. Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 350; Vagley &
Blanton, supra note 1, at 647. One commentator characterized the asbestosis situation as
"the most widespread and confounding outbreak of occupational disease ever to sweep the
United States." Reibstein, The Deadly Curse of Asbestos, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 7,
1982 (Magazine), at 12, col. 3.
8 See Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6, at 1152; Comment, supra note 3, at 664. It
was estimated that approximately 16,000 asbestos-related suits were pending in April 1982,
and that the caseload was growing by 400 to 500 per month. Winter, supra note 1, at 397.
The majority of the litigation has arisen in the federal courts, with jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship. See, e.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1130 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d
1034, 1040 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). Commonly named de-
fendants include manufacturers such as Johns-Manville, Eagle-Picher, Owens-Coming,
Pittsburgh-Corning, Celotex, Keene Corp., Armstrong Cork Co., and Raybestos-Manhattan.
Mansfield, supra note 1, at 865.
8 E.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1040 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
95 Misc. 2d 222, 223, 406 N.Y.S.2d 658, 658 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); Mehaffy, supra
note 1, at 350; Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 636; infra note 12 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 42-87 and accompanying text.
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this question, since employers typically change insurers several
times between the initial period of exposure and the time of mani-
festation."' Accordingly, this Note focuses upon the insurer's liabil-
ity issues raised by asbestosis litigation. After a brief discussion of
the disease itself and the attendant problems in the litigation con-
text, the Note will present the judicial views on the subject-the
exposure theory, the manifestation theory, and an approach which
is essentially a hybrid of the two. The Note concludes that the
manifestation theory provides the most workable solution and
that, combined with certain finely tuned legislation, it will promote
the expeditious and equitable resolution of asbestosis claims.
I. ASBESTOSIS AND THE INSURANCE PROBLEM
Asbestosis is an incurable lung condition which results after
many years of development12 from the inhalation of asbestos
fibers. 13 These fibers embed in the lungs,'14 and over time, can lead
" See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
12 A. HAMILTON & H. HARDY, INDUSTRIAL TOXICOLOGY 423-28 (3d ed. 1974). Asbestosis is
generally characterized as a cumulative or progressive disease, due to the considerable
amount of time that normally elapses between the initial inhalation of asbestos fibers and
the point at which operation of the lungs is impaired and the disease becomes diagnosable.
Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109
(1981); A. HAMILTON & H. HARDY, supra, at 423; 11 J. KALISCH & H. WILLIAMS, COURTROOM
MEDICINE § 12B.40, at 12B-9 (1982); 3 C. TEDESCHI, supra note 1, at 1290; see Rosow &
Liederman, supra note 6, at 1155; Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 638; Comment, In-
surer Liability in the Asbestos Disease Context-Application of the Reasonable Expecta-
tions Doctrine, 27 S.D.L. REV. 239, 240 (1982). The progressive nature of asbestosis, coupled
with the ill-defined contours of the early stages of the disease, contributes to difficulty in
diagnosis, A. HAMILTON & H. HARDY, supra, at 423; C. TEDESCIII, supra note 1, at 1286-87;
Heppleston, Silica and Asbestos: Contrasts In Tissue Response, 330 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
Sci. 725, 726 Fig. 2 (1979), and leads to great confusion in the litigation context as courts
attempt to determine the point of exposure, see infra note 36. It should be noted, however,
that certain levels of exposure to asbestos may not result in disease. See Mansfield, supra
note 1, at 861; infra note 30.
11 Asbestos refers to a combination of mineral dusts found in a fibrous mineral material
known primarily for its strength and resistance to heat. A. HAMILTON & H. HARDY, supra
note 12, at 421; D. HUNTER, THE DISEASES OF OCCUPATIONS 957-58 (1962). It has been char-
acterized as "one of the most dangerous of all natural materials." Mehaffy, supra note 1, at
341. In addition to asbestosis, exposure to asbestos may result in mesothelioma and
bronchogenic carcinoma. 11 J. KALISCH & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, §§ 12B.90-.94, at
12B-17 to 12B-22; 3 C. TEDESCHI, supra note 1, at 1282-86; Berry & Lewinsohn, Dose-Re-
sponse Relationships For Asbestos-Related Disease: Implications For Hygiene Standards,
Part L Morbidity, 330 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Scd. 185, 185 (1979).
" 11 J. KALIScH & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 12B.00 at 12B-2, § 12B.30, at 12B-8; 3
C. TEDESCHI, supra note 1, at 1279, 1282. For a general discussion of asbestosis, see Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-85 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
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to difficulty in breathing and a potentially fatal dysfunctioning of
the lungs. 15 While the medical community has been aware of asbes-
tosis for quite some time," asbestos continued to be used in an
overwhelming number of products, 17 primarily during the middle
of this century."' As a result, masses of people were in a position to
inhale the fiber," and the results of these encounters are now be-
U.S. 869 (1974); Selikoff, Bader, Bader, Churg & Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplasia, 42
AM. J. MED. 487, 487-92 (1967); Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis
Among Insulation Workers, 132 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 139, 139-47 (1965).
1 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-85 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); 11 J. KALISCH & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 12B.30, at 12B-
8; 3 C. TEDESCHI, supra note 1, at 1290. The prolonged presence of asbestos fibers in the
lungs results in pulmonary fibrosis, leading to an inhibition of air flow. D. HUNTER, supra
note 13, at 963; 11 J. KALISCH & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 12B.30, at 12B-9. The degree
of risk and development of fibrosis varies with the length and degree of exposure and the
size and type of fiber. 11 J. KALISCH & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 12B.00, at 12B-2;
Seidman, Selikoff, & Hammond, Short-term Asbestos Work Exposure and Long-Term Ob-
servation, 330 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Scr. 61, 84-88 (1979). Accentuating the high-risk nature of
asbestosis is the fact that there presently is no cure. A. HAMILTON & H. HARDY, supra note
12, at 428; 11 J. KALISCH & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 12B.70, at 12B-16.
"6 See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); A. HAMILTON & H. HARDY, supra note 12, at 422; D. HUNTER,
supra note 13, at 960. Although cases of asbestosis were reported in the early part of this
century, the hazards of the disease generally were not recognized until the 1930's. Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1083 & n.7; D. HUNTER, supra note 13, at 960;
see Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 343. Suspicions regarding asbestosis were confirmed by 1965,
when Doctor Irving J. Selikoff issued his definitive report. See Mehaffy, supra note 1, at
344; Selikoff, Churg & Hammond, supra note 14, at 147.
17 See Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 637. It is estimated that there are at least
3,000 products in use today containing asbestos. Id.; Mansfield, supra note 1, at 861. Its
heat resistant and flexible qualities make it ideal for a variety of commercial products in-
cluding brake shoes, Mansfield, supra note 1, at 861, pipe coverings, air conditioning ducts,
shingles and insulation, Comment, supra note 3, at 664 n.40. Additionally, asbestos may be
present in such consumer products as hair dryers, cigarette filters, see Mehaffy, supra note
1, at 351, toothbrushes and ironing board covers, Mansfield, supra note 1, at 861.
"a See Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 637; Comment, supra note 3, at 665. Over 30
million tons of asbestos have been used in the United States this century. Mehaffy, supra
note 1, at 342; Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 637. Most manufacturers began to curtail
production of products containing asbestos toward the end of the 1960's, in response to the
spiraling number of asbestosis cases reported. E.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1215. This does not completely solve the problem, however,
since asbestos fibers may be released into the atmosphere upon the removal of existing as-
bestos-containing installations. Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 351; Prust, Future Problems to be
Anticipate& Demolition, Repair, and Disposal, 330 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sc. 545, 545 (1979).
1" See supra note 7. The staggering number of potential asbestosis victims has pro-
voked observers to exclaim that "the U.S. is suffering from an epidemic of mass murder by
the American asbestos industry." Rotbart & Joseph; Upbeat Ads From Manville Anger
Some, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 3, at 36, col. 3. Much of the litigation to date has
involved shipyard and insulation workers. See Duty to Indemnify and to Defend-Each
Insurer Which Provides Coverage During Worker's Exposure to Asbestosis is Proportion-
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ginning to manifest themselves."
As with many other disease-causing materials, there is some
evidence that those responsible for the introduction of asbestos
into society knew of its possible adverse effects and failed to pro-
vide that information to those who would be exposed.21 Conse-
quently, courts have held these manufacturers liable for the claims
of their victims.2 2 The courts have facilitated resolution of such
claims by attempting to overcome certain inherent barriers to liti-
gation. For example, courts generally have cleared the statute of
limitations hurdle presented by the latency of the disease by
adopting a "discovery" rule in determining when the cause of ac-
tion accrues. 23 In addition, they have resolved the problem of iden-
tifying the culpable source of a particular substance through vari-
ous judicial techniques characterized as forms of industry-wide or
market-share liability. 24
ately and Individually Liable to Defend and Indemnify Its Insured, 26 VML. L. REV. 1080,
1084 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Insurer's Duty].
20 See Comment, supra note 3, at 665. It has been observed that the effects of exposure
during the peak periods of asbestos-product use will not become evident until the 1990's.
See id.
21 See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1086; Mansfield, supra note
1, at 866; Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 343.
22 E.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1096. The Borel decision is
generally credited with triggering the asbestosis-litigation explosion. See Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1215.
23 Mansfield, supra note 1, at 868; Comment, supra note 3, at 659; Casenote, Products
Liability Insurance-Time of Exposure Triggers Coverage For Asbestos-Related Diseases,
26 WAYNE L. REV. 1127, 1132 (1980); infra note 105.
2 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). Sindell involved a plaintiff who devel-
oped a malignant tumor as a result of her mother's ingestion of Diethylstilbestrol (DES). Id.
at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Since all the defendants in the case had
produced identical formulas of the drug, it could not be determined which defendant had
manufactured the particular brand of the drug taken by plaintiff's mother. Id. at 611, 607
P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. In addressing the problem of apportioning liability, the
court held that where a plaintiff names as defendants manufacturers who service a substan-
tial share of the market of a product, the liability of such manufacturers will be measured
by the percentage of the total output of the product sold by each of them unless a manufac-
turer demonstrates that it could not have produced the product that caused the plaintiff's
injury. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
A similar theory, known as "enterprise liability," has been applied to facts similar to
Sindell. Since this theory is premised on the notion of concerted action among the members
of an industry, see Hall v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 379 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Note, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963,
995-96 (1978), liability is imposed upon all industry members, 345 F. Supp. at 378. Failing
to find the requisite concerted action, however, the Sindell court declined to apply the en-
terprise theory of liability. See 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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The issue which has continued to plague the courts in asbes-
tos-related litigation is the question of which insurer 5 should be
made to pay for liability incurred.2 6 The long period of latency,
characteristic of asbestosis,27 has resulted in several insurance com-
panies being "on the risk" over a 20- or 30- year period.28 For in-
stance, a given insurance company may have been on the risk at
the initial point of exposure to the substance, a different company
may be involved at the point when the disease or disability be-
comes manifest, and one or more companies may be involved in
the intermittent years.29 The problem is further complicated by
the difficulty medical experts encounter in determining precisely
when the injury "occurs" within the meaning of the insurance
policy.30
Under both the enterprise theory and the Sindell market-share theory, the plaintiff is re-
lieved of the burden of identifying the manufacturer of the product that caused the injury.
See Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 379; Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
145. Additionally, both theories require the defendant-manufacturer to prove that its prod-
uct could not have injured the plaintiff in order to be relieved of liability. See Hall, 345 F.
Supp. at 380; Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. While these
theories of liability have not been adopted in the asbestos context, they potentially are ap-
plicable both to asbestos and to other latent injuries. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at
647.
'5 Typically, manufacturers involved in the asbestosis controversy have insurance to
protect themselves against products liability lawsuits. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1215. Products liability insurance protects the insured
against the imposition of damages for injuries resulting from products manufactured or sold
by the insured. See 2 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABmIITY INSURANCE § 11.01, at 11-3 (1982);
Shea, Products Liability: A Continuing Process of Change, 68 A.B.A. J. 576, 577 (1977).
20 See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1982) (No. 82-1097); Porter v. American Opti-
cal Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1130 (5th Cir.) (describing "novelty of the issues presented with
reference to insurance coverage"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Keene Corp. v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980)
("novel and important question of insurance law"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). One
observer has been prompted to characterize asbestosis litigation as "the insurance industry's
'liability nightmare.'" Winter, supra note 1, at 399 (quoting Dr. Irving Selikoff).
27 See supra notes 9 & 12 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 15; Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1040; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1215; 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRoDucTs LIAmLITY §
50.01C, at 19-60.1 (1982); Comment, supra note 3, at 666.
29 See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 16; Comment,
supra note 3, at 662.
20 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216. While the
medical community is certain that inhalation of excessive levels of asbestos does lead to
disease, several uncertainties exist regarding the actual development of the illness, which
have proven problematic in the litigation context. See id. at 1214-16; Comment, supra note
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The standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy
(CGL),31 utilized by industries associated with a high risk of occu-
pational disease, provides for coverage of" 'bodily injury'3 2 caused
by an 'occurrence' 3 3 during the policy period."3 4 In the normal in-
surance liability context, application of this policy language should
be fairly simple. 35 When dealing with diseases of a progressive na-
ture, however, courts inconsistently have marshalled the medical
evidence in determining the point at which injury occurs.3
12, at 242. In addition to the progressive nature of the disease, see supra note 12, diagnosis
of asbestosis is made difficult by the variance in pathological changes occurring in asbestosis
victims, depending on the kind and quality of fibers inhaled and the length of exposure. See
A. HAMILTON & H. HARDY, supra note 12, at 424; D. HUNTER, supra note 13, at 963. These
variables, coupled with the effects of outside influences, such as cigarette smoke and other
carcinogens, workplace ventilation, and the effects of personal stress, render difficult any
attempt at a retrospective assessment of the nature of exposure. A. HAMILTON & H. HARDY,
supra note 12, at 421-24. Moreover, a disagreement exists in the medical literature regarding
whether fibrosis of the lungs progresses after cessation of exposure. See id. at 424-25; 4A R.
GRAY, ATTORNEY's TEXTBOOK ON MEDICINE § 205C.60, at 205C-18 (1982). Finally, it is not
known what levels of exposure are required to cause asbestosis, or indeed whether exposure
to asbestos fibers will result in asbestosis at all in a given case. See A. HAMILTON & H.
HARDY, supra note 12, at 422, 428.
" Typically, the manufacturers in the insidious-disease controversy are covered under a
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy. Comment, supra note 12, at 243; see, e.g.,
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216. The CGL policy
is designed to remedy the problems faced by an insured seeking complete coverage under
the former separate-policy system. See R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER & C. WILLIAMS, INSURANCE
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES-PROPERTY AND LIABILITY 443 (6th ed. 1976). The CGL policy
covers all risks which are not specifically excluded. 2 R. LONG, supra note 25, § 11.01, at 11-
2.
82 "Bodily injury" is typically defined as "sickness or disease sustained by any person
which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom."
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216.
33 "Occurrence" is customarily defined as "an accident, including injurious exposure to
conditions which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury .... "Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216.
3' Comment, supra note 12, at 243; see, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 17; Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1039; Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216.
88 See Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6, at 1150. Normally, there is little difficulty in
determining the point of occurrence because the act of the insured and the alleged injury
occur simultaneously. Id.
38 Comment, supra note 12, at 241. Compare Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1222 (injury occurs at exposure) with Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 25 (injury occurs at manifestation). It generally is
conceded that injuries with long latency periods do not fit clearly within the CGL policy
language. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216; 3A
L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, § 50.01C, at 19-60.1; Insurer's Duty, supra note
19, at 1086.
1983]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:485
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE INSURANCE PROBLEM IN
ASBESTOsis LITIGATION
Two general approaches to the liability problem have emerged
in asbestosis litigation-the exposure theory"7 and the manifesta-
tion theory.38 Insurance companies have tended to embrace the
theory that best represents their interests in a particular case.s9
Briefly, the manifestation theorists contend that bodily injury does
not occur until the point at which the disease is clinically manifest,
and thus, the insurer on the risk at that point is the one liable.40
The exposure theorists, on the other hand, maintain that the bod-
37 See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text; see also Champion Int'l Corp. v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 546 F.2d 502, 506 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 399 F. Supp. 12, 16 (W.D. Pa. 1975). The
courts in both Champion and Union Carbide adopted theories of liability analogous to the
exposure theory determining that damage occurs at the time injury is caused rather than at
the point of manifestation of its effects. See Champion, 546 F.2d at 506; Union Carbide, 399
F. Supp. at 16. It should be noted, however, that the resultant damages in both Champion
and Union Carbide were capable of being traced to a single identifiable event. See Cham-
pion, 546 F.2d at 505 (delivery date of defective goods); Union Carbide, 399 F. Supp. at 21
(date insured made decision to allow contaminant to remain in chemical that ultimately
harmed consumers is date of occurrence in products liability action). Presumably, the long
latency period involved in asbestosis, see supra text accompanying notes 9-11; note 12 and
accompanying text, makes it difficult to identify the actual date of "exposure," rendering
mechanical application of the exposure theory of liability problematic. It is for this reason
that the exposure theory has been criticized as contrary to traditional insurance and tort law
principles that impose liability only when damage becomes apparent. Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1229 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 40 & 58-77 and accompanying text. The manifestation theory of lia-
bility historically has been applied in a variety of factual contexts. See, e.g., Appalachian
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982) (sex discrimination class
action); Tijsseling v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623,
626, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681, 683 (Ct. App. 1976) (misrepresentations relative upon sale of prop-
erty); Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 85, 295 P.2d 19, 21-22 (Ct.
App. 1956) (rock slide caused by grading operation); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
American Ins. Co., 169 Ind. App. 1, 3, 345 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1976) (defective bricks); Mutual
v. Newark Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 237, 246 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (collapse of wall); Singsaas v.
Diederich, 307 Minn. 153, 155, 238 N.W.2d 878, 880 (1976) (negligent repair of grain eleva-
tor). Typically, the manifestation theory is applied in the products liability context, where
loss occurring during the policy period is deemed to be covered, notwithstanding the fact
that it is the result of a defect in existence in a prior term of insurance coverage. 11 G.
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 44:393, at 567 (2d ed. 1982).
11 Casenote, supra note 23, at 1128. An insurer who is on the risk at the time of initial
exposure will urge the manifestation theory of liability, while an insurer on the risk at the
point at which the injury becomes apparent will tend to promote the exposure theory of
liability. Id.
'0 See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216;
Mansfield, supra note 1, at 876; Comment, supra note 12, at 244; Casenote, supra note 23,
at 1128; Insurer's Duty, supra note 19, at 1086.
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ily injury triggering insurance coverage occurs at a point just after
the initial inhalation of the fibers.41
A. The Exposure Theory
The exposure theory was adopted in one of the first cases to
arise in the asbestosis-insurance litigation context. Insurance Com-
pany of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 42 involved
liability resulting from the manufacture of products containing as-
bestos by Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., between 1923 and 1970.4'
During that period, at least five insurance companies were on the
risk at various times." One of these insurers brought a declaratory
judgment action to determine the point at which insurer's liability
attached.45
The Michigan district court adopted the exposure theory of
liability,46 relying primarily on a finding that the injury in asbesto-
sis cases occurs at the point of inhalation of the asbestos fibers.47
4, See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1217;
Mansfield, supra note 1, at 876. In addition to the manifestation and exposure theories, an
approach which is a hybrid of the two has been applied. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1041. In Keene, the court held that each insurer on the risk between
exposure and manifestation was liable. Id.; see infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
42 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
43 633 F.2d at 1214. Nearly a decade after Forty-Eight had discontinued the manufac-
ture of products containing asbestos, there were over 1000 lawsuits filed against it by work-
ers suffering from diseases allegedly caused by asbestos inhalation. See id. at 1215. The
district court noted, however, that Forty-Eight's liability for asbestos-related injuries did
not cease at the point at which such manufacturing was discontinued, since it was foresee-
able that actions would be brought in connection with past exposure, as well as exposure
resulting from the release of asbestos fibers from the demolition of existing structures. Id. at
1223.
" Id. at 1215. Forty-Eight was insured by the Insurance Co. of North America (INA)
from October 31, 1955 to October 31, 1972. Id. Upon termination of the INA policy, Forty-
Eight was covered by the Affiliated FM Insurance Company (from October 31, 1972 to Janu-
ary 10, 1975), by the Illinois National Insurance Company (from January 10, 1975 to Janu-
ary 12, 1976), by the Travelers Indemnity Company of Rhode Island (from January 12, 1976
to November 8, 1976), and by the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (from November 8,
1976 to date). Id. Since any insurance records alleged to exist for the period prior to 1955
had been lost or destroyed, Forty-Eight was deemed to have been self-insured for that pe-
riod. Id. at 1215 & n.4.
15 Id. at 1216. Insurance companies commonly employ the declaratory judgment action
in an attempt to resolve coverage disputes. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667
F.2d at 1040 n.8; see Comment, supra note 12, at 240 n.8.
" Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1242
(E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
47 451 F. Supp. at 1239. The court opined that, based upon the medical evidence, an
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The Sixth Circuit affirmed, 48 agreeing that the exposure theory was
supported by the medical testimony. 49 The court reasoned that ap-
plication of the exposure theory in asbestosis cases is consistent
with the parties' expectations" and with the court's desire to pro-
mote coverage.5' Liability, the court concluded, should be prorated
among all of the insurers on the risk during the time of exposure.52
The court conceded, however, that an insurer might disclaim liabil-
ity by showing that no asbestos exposure occurred during certain
years while it was on the risk. 3
The exposure theory promulgated in Forty-Eight was subse-
quently adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Porter v. American Opti-
cal Corp.54 Although it appeared that a clear trend toward the ex-
occurrence takes place shortly after inhalation, notwithstanding the fact that some individu-
als who have been exposed to asbestos never incur tissue damage. Id.
48 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
49 633 F.2d at 1218. The circuit court noted with approval the district court's rationale
that asbestosis is a progressive disease involving an injury which occurs shortly after inhala-
tion. Id. While the court conceded that the manifestation theorists correctly argue that
"compensable bodily injury," and not tissue damage, is what matters under the contract, id.
(emphasis supplied by court), it nonetheless observed that "there is universal medical agree-
ment that the time when asbestosis manifests itself is not the time when the disease oc-
curred," id. at 1219.
50 Id. at 1219. The court noted first that liability in the asbestos cases is premised upon
the continued inhalation of asbestos fibers by workers following the manufacturer's failure
to warn. The court reasoned that since the purpose of CGL policies is to provide the manu-
facturer with coverage against product liability lawsuits, "[t]he contracting parties would
expect [such] coverage to parallel the theory of liability." Id.
11 Id. Reasoning that the policy terms were inherently ambiguous in the latent disease
context, the court resorted to the maxim of construing doubts in favor of the insured. Id. at
1222.
52 Id. at 1225. The court asserted that only questions of contract law are involved in the
allocation of liability, characterizing the insurer's liability as "individual and proportionate"
rather than "joint and several." Id.
53 Id. An insurer might disclaim liability by showing that no injury could have occurred
in a given period by reason of the worker's use of a respirator. Id. The Sixth Circuit recog-
nized that the insured generally carries the burden of showing coverage. Because an injured
asbestos worker need only prove that the products of a particular manufacturer contributed
at any time to his injury to subject that manufacturer to liability, the court deemed it "ap-
propriate to presumptively view each manufacturer as being on the risk for each of the
years in which a worker was exposed to asbestosis." Id. at 1225 n.27 (emphasis supplied by
court).
641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). In Porter, an
asbestosis victim sued a manufacturer who had supplied respiratory masks at an asbestos-
cement products plant at which he was employed. Id. at 1131. During most of the worker's
exposure, the respiratory mask manufacturer was covered under various products liability
insurance policies. Id. at 1142-43. The Porter court initially noted that the principles in-
volved in cases where the insured is an asbestos-products manufacturer are equally applica-
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posure theory was emerging,"5 subsequent decisions adopted either
the manifestation theory56 or a hybrid approach.517
B. The Manifestation Theory
The manifestation theory was first adopted in the insidious-
disease context in a case involving the liability of a DES5" manu-
facturer's insurance company for injuries resulting from ingestion
of the drug.5 9 The court imposed liability on the insurer on the risk
at the point of manifestation of cervical cancer, maintaining that
"coverage is predicated not on the act which might give rise to ulti-
mate liability, but upon the result."60 The manifestation theory
was subsequently adopted, albeit impliedly, 1 in a case involving
ble where the insured is a manufacturer of respiratory masks. Id. at 1144.
Il Shea, Product Liability: Recent Changes Are Leading Toward National Legislation,
54 N.Y.S.B.J. 524, 525 (1982). In addition to the Fifth Circuit, the District of Columbia
District Court, in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 513 F. Supp. 47 (D.D.C.), modi-
fied, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982), adopted the expo-
sure theory promulgated in Forty-Eight. See 513 F. Supp. at 51. On appeal, the District of
Columbia Circuit modified the opinion, adopting essentially a hybrid approach. 667 F.2d at
1047; see infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
" See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1982); infra notes 58-75 & 77 and accompanying
text.
S. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
59 American Motorists Ins. Co. v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d 222, 227, 406
N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978). Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a synthetic es-
trogen which was prescribed to millions of women in the United States from the late 1940's
until 1971, under the belief that it would prevent miscarriages. See Robinson, Multiple
Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 718 (1982); Note,
supra note 24, at 963-64. In 1971, after medical evidence revealed a statistically significant
link between the use of DES and adenocarcinoma of the vagina and uterus, the Food and
Drug Administration contraindicated the drug's use for prevention of miscarriages. Robin-
son, supra, at 718; Note, supra note 24, at 964-67.
59 95 Misc. 2d at 223, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 659. The drug manufacturer was sued by three
women whose mothers had ingested DES during pregnancy in 1952, 1953 and 1961, respec-
tively. Id. The court conceded that the exposure occurred at the time the drugs were in-
gested. Id. The women discovered in 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, that they had devel-
oped cervical cancer. Id. The American Motorist Insurance Company, which did not begin
bearing the risk until 1968, contended that the injuries were not covered under its policy. Id.
60 Id. at 224, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 659. The court noted that a result-oriented approach to
predicating coverage is consistent with the various commentary that surrounded the adop-
tion of the CGL policy language. Id., 406 N.Y.S.2d at 660. Thus, the court held that the
insurer on the risk at the point of manifestation was liable. Id. at 226, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
61 See Michigan Chem. Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 530 F. Supp. 147, 154-55 (W.D.
Mich. 1982). In Michigan Chemical, a manufacturer of the toxin known as polybrominated
bipheny (PBB), see infra note 62, was the subject of hundreds of suits by Michigan farmers
who claimed that they were damaged by the spread of the toxin when Michigan Chemical
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the toxin polybrominated bipheny (PBB)62 Significantly, the the-
ory was also embraced in the most recent decision in the asbestos-
insurance controversy, Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co."5
In the wake of over 5,500 asbestos-related lawsuits' 4 Eagle-
Picher Industries, Inc., filed a declaratory judgment action to de-
termine the liability of its insurers.6 5 In adopting the manifestation
theory of liability,6 the Massachusetts District Court noted that
the language of the insurance policies explicitly focused upon the
Corp. mistakenly shipped it in place of the requested feed supplement. 530 F. Supp. at 148.
The PBB was fed to dairy cattle across the state, causing a decrease in milk production, id.
at 149, and exposing approximately 9 million Michigan residents to the toxin through their
normal diet. ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH, supra note 6, at 33. See generally Grzech, PBB, in
WHO'S POISONING AMERICA 60-84 (R. Nader ed. 1981).
Michigan Chemical's primary coverage over the period was under an "occurrence" pol-
icy with the Traveler's Indemnity Company. Additionally, however, the company had a
complicated scheme consisting of excess layers of insurance and reinsurance involving sev-
eral companies, including Lloyd's, London, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Insurance
Company of North America, and American Mutual Reinsurance Company. 530 F. Supp. at
149. As the policies generally provided for payment at fixed sums on a per-occurrence basis,
the question in the case was whether there was more than one occurrence and, if so, when
these occurrences took place. Id.
In the declaratory judgment action brought to determine which of the several insurance
companies involved was liable, the court reserved judgment on the manifestation-exposure
dilemma, due to the lack of medical evidence of damage resulting from PBB ingestion and
the lack of evidence regarding the time of exposure. Id. at 155. The court implicitly adopted
the manifestation approach, however, by its construction that the occurrence took place at
the time of the resultant property damage, rather than at the time of the shipment of the
toxin. Id. at 154-55.
62 530 F. Supp. at 148. The various chemicals which fall under the heading PBB are
highly toxic substances used primarily as fire retardants. ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH, supra
note 6, at 30. While the full toxic effects of PBB are unknown, it has been medically linked
with such problems as loss of memory and sleep, muscular weakness, abdominal pain, and,
possibly, cancer. Id. at 33.
11 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1983) (No.
82-1097).
" Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Mass.
1981), aff'd, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1983)
(No. 82-1097). In Eagle-Picher, the insurance controversy centered around the underlying
liability of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. (Eagle-Picher) which manufactured asbestos-con-
taining insulation products during the period from 1931 to 1971. Id.
15 Id. Eagle-Picher was not insured for asbestos-related claims prior to 1968. It was
covered by a policy with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company from 1968 to 1978. Id. Addi-
tionally, the coverage of Eagle-Picher over the period from 1973 to 1979 was from one to two
layers of excess insurance involving a multitude of American- and London-based insurance
companies. Id. at 111-12. The companies disagreed as to the appropriate theory under which
liability should have attached. Id. at 111. While the parties stipulated that the language of
the policies was clear and unambiguous, they did not agree as to its meaning. Id. at 113.
6 Id. at 118.
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resulting disease, not on its cause.17 Construing the policy language
from a layman's point of view,6e the court noted that the phrase
"results in personal injury" referred not to "sub-clinical cellular
changes,"' 9 but to the manifestation of "clinically evident dis-
ease.' 70 The court also indicated that the manifestation theory
would best promote coverage in the case before it.71
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed as modified the holding
of the district court. 2 The reviewing court agreed that the mani-
festation theory is the best approach to the insurance problem,7 3
noting that since exposure does not inevitably result in asbestosis,
the medical evidence could not be read to indicate that disease oc-
curs at the point of exposure. 4 The court observed, based upon the
contract language, that "each occurrence is made up of two compo-
nents, the exposure and the resulting bodily injury. '7 5 The First
Circuit parted with the district court as to the definition of mani-
festation, holding that a disease is manifest "when it becomes rea-
sonably capable of medical diagnosis '7 6 rather than on the date of
actual diagnosis."
67 Id. at 114. The court observed that although the policies commonly refer to "'occur-
rence during the policy period,' their definition of occurrence also links the resulting injury,
not the exposure to conditions, to the policy period." Id.
66 Id. at 116. The court observed that traditional insurance law requires that unambigu-
ous contract terms be given their ordinary meaning. Id. at 115-16.
69 Id. at 115. The court declined to adopt the view that exposure produces instantane-
ous injury, noting that most fibers which are inhaled are later removed, and that even when
some do embed in, or scar, the lungs, there is no certainty that disease or death will result.
Id.; see supra note 30.
71 523 F. Supp. at 115. The court defined manifestation as "the date of actual diagnosis
or, with respect to those cases in which no diagnosis was made prior to death, the date of
death." Id. at 118.
71 Id. at 118. It should be noted that Eagle-Picher was uninsured prior to 1968. See
supra note 65. Thus, the court was reluctant to adopt the exposure theory, for the conse-
quence of such a ruling would be to effectively leave Eagle-Picher without insurance cover-
age. 523 F. Supp. at 115.
7 Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1982) (No. 82-1097).
7 Id. at 16.
7' Id. at 18-19.
7. Id. at 17.
76 Id. at 25. While observing that the district court's holding was designed to promote
easily ascertainable coverage, the court concluded that "administrative convenience, how-
ever desirable, cannot override the principles of construction .... " Id. at 24.
7 Id. at 25; see supra note 70.
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C. A Hybrid Approach
The District of Columbia Circuit was confronted with the is-
sue of liability of various insurers' 8 of an asbestos manufacturer 7
in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America.s0 The court
avoided the analytical conflict between the manifestation and ex-
posure approaches in a broad articulation of insurers' liability that
essentially adopted both theories.81 The lower court in Keene held
that liability should be apportioned among those insurers on the
risk during the period of exposure.2 In combining the manifesta-
tion and exposure theories,83 the circuit court declared itself to be
interpreting the reasonable expectations of the parties to the insur-
ance contract,84 and referred to its obligation to effectuate "the
policies' dominant purpose of indemnity."' These considerations,
reasoned the court, give way to the conclusion that insurers' liabil-
ity should attach at the point the disease manifests8 as well as at
all points during the period of exposure.87
78 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). Keene Corporation was covered during the period from 1948
to 1959 by the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company. A dispute as
to whether that policy included products liability coverage is the subject of another case. Id.
at 1038-39 n.5; see Keene Corp. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs.' Assoc. Ins. Co., 513 F. Supp. 47
(D.D.C. 1981), remanded, No. 81-1248 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 1981). Subsequently, Keene was
covered by the Insurance Company of North America (1961-1968), Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Company (1967-1968 and 1974-1980), Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (1968-
1971), and the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (1971-1974). 667 F.2d at 1038.
79 Keene Corporation and its subsidiaries primarily manufactured and sold asbestos-
containing thermal insulation products during the period from 1948 to 1972. 667 F.2d at
1038 & n.1. Accordingly, Keene has been named in over 6,000 lawsuits, primarily involving
insulation workers who allege injury as a result of exposure to the insulation. Id. at 1038.
80 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
81 Id. at 1047; see infra note 83.
82 Keene Corp., 513 F. Supp. at 51.
11 667 F.2d at 1047. The court stated that "inhalation exposure, exposure in residence,
and manifestation all trigger coverage under the policies." Id.
84 Id. at 1041; see Comment, supra note 12, at 252-58; infra notes 134-45 and accompa-
nying text.
85 667 F.2d at 1041; see 7 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 18 (Jaeger 3d ed.
1959). According to Couch, "presumably it is the intention of the insurer to have the insured
understand that in the event of loss, he will be protected to the full extent that any fair
interpretation will allow." 1 G. CoucH, supra note 38, § 15:41, at 721-22 (2d ed. 1959).
88 667 F.2d at 1044. The court reasoned that the manifestation approach is consistent
with the notion that an insured would expect to be covered for liability resulting from a
latent condition of which it could not be aware. Id.
87 Id. at 1045. The court observed that a consequence of the manifestation theory is
that insurers will terminate future coverage for a given class of injuries following manifesta-
tion of a few initial claims. Id. at 1046. To avoid such a possibility, the court reasoned that
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III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
Given the judicial conflict,88 the volume of litigation,89 and the
effect on the rates and availability of coverage of asbestos-related
claims,90 it is imperative that a comprehensive resolution of the in-
surer liability question be reached.91 Recognizing that there are
both advantages and disadvantages to each approach, it is submit-
ted that the manifestation theory is the preferable approach to in-
surer liability.
A. The Manifestation Theory Will Simplify Asbestosis Liti-
gation
An initial advantage of the manifestation theory is that it re-
lieves courts of the burden of analyzing the medical evidence in a
given case.2 As previously noted, a major difficulty facing courts in
asbestosis litigation is the question of proper interpretation of the
medical evidence." The exposure theorists argue that the medical
those insurers on the risk during the period of exposure to asbestos should also be liable. Id.
at 1046.
88 E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 25 (manifestation
theory); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1047 (both manifestation and
exposure trigger liability); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d at 1131 (exposure
theory); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1223 (exposure
theory); see Comment, supra note 12, at 241. In the face of the obvious split among the
circuit courts, the Supreme Court continues to deny certiorari. Justices Again Refuse To
Settle Asbestos Case, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1983, at D1, col. 1; see, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus.,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3650
(U.S. Mar. 7, 1983) (No. 82-1097); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641
F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); see
Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6, at 1162; Shea, supra note 25, at 578.
89 See supra note 8.
90 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, § 50.O1C, at 19-60; Mansfield, supra
note 1, at 875. It has been stated that asbestosis litigation will affect the rates and availabil-
ity of coverage in cases involving a multitude of carcinogens. Id. For a cursory discussion of
insurance rate-making policy, see R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at
443-44.
" The one point upon which parties involved in asbestos-related litigation agree is the
need for an administratively workable solution. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1218; Insurer's Duty, supra note 19, at 1090.
92 See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1217;
Michigan Chem. Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 530 F. Supp. at 155; Eagle-Picher Indus.,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 115; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. at 1236; Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6, at 1155; Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 693; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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evidence in continuing-injury cases, such as asbestosis, indicates
that the condition "occurs" upon or shortly after inhalation, and
thus well before manifestation. 4 This reasoning is problematical,
however, since it cannot be determined whether the presence of
asbestos fibers in an exposed individual's lungs will in fact lead to
asbestosis.95 Moreover, if such an individual does contract asbesto-
sis, the length and degree of exposure which actually caused the
disease cannot be determined with any degree of precision.96 It is
contended, therefore, that the concept of exposure fails to provide
a medically or legally useful point of reference in asbestosis cases
and, further, that these failures justify looking to the point of man-
ifestation as the proper theory for determining liability.97
A related virtue of the manifestation theory, on a practical
level, is its administrative expediency. As noted, use of this theory
avoids the necessity of each court evaluating extensive medical evi-
dence to determine the point of occurrence.9 ' By eliminating com-
plex questions of pathological cause and effect, resort to the mani-
festation theory would serve to reduce the costs and delays of
asbestosis litigation.9
94 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1218 (medical
testimony strongly supports exposure theory); see Mansfield, supra note 1, at 86; Rosow &
Liederman, supra note 6, at 1159; Comment, supra note 12, at 245; Casenote, supra note 23,
at 1137. In Forty-Eight, the Sixth Circuit noted approvingly that the district court had
deemed injury to occur upon inhalation based upon the evidence that "each. . . inhalation
of asbestos fibers results in the build-up of additional scar tissue in the lungs. . . . "Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1218.
" Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 18; 11 J. KALISCH & H.
WILLIAMS, supra note 12, § 12B.31, at 12B-9. One medical expert has noted that "over 90%
of all urban city dwellers have some asbestos-related scarring, but only a tiny percentage of
those exposed will ever develop clinical asbestosis." Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 115 (testimony of Dr. Bernard Gee, research scientist and
clinician).
See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 18; supra note 30.
One court noted that the cumulative nature of the development of the disease, combined
with such factors as "variations in ventilation, moisture in the air, and an exposed person's
health at the time of any exposure" make it nearly impossible to determine the level of
exposure necessary to cause disease. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 451 F. Supp. at 1237.
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 18, 22; see Comment,
supra note 12, at 244-45.
98 Interpretation of the medical evidence is unnecessary under the manifestation ap-
proach. Comment, supra note 12, at 245.
91 Although theoretically it might be deemed desirable to review the medical evidence
in each case in order to determine the point at which the injury occurs, the cost of such a
procedure would be prohibitive. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 633 F.2d at 1218; Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6, at 1158. It should be noted that
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B. The Manifestation Theory Is Supported by Analogous Insur-
ance Law Precedent
Viewed in a broader perspective, adoption of the manifesta-
tion theory in asbestosis litigation appears to be consistent with
insurance law precedent. Indeed, manifestation theorists draw sup-
port from such diverse sources as cases construing statutes of limi-
tations and worker's compensation law principles in the insidious
disease context, 00 as well as case law involving health insurance
contracts and traditional insurance contract interpretation.101
Traditionally, insidious disease cases have raised troublesome
issues with respect to statutes of limitations. Since, under conven-
tional analysis, the statute would begin to run from the point of
exposure, a victim would be barred from bringing his claim long
before he could ever be aware of his injury.10 Although the pur-
pose behind the concept of a statute of limitations is one of repose,
designed to protect a defendant from stale claims made by those
who have "slumbered on their rights," 0 3 an unduly harsh applica-
tion of the bar to those who are "blamelessly unaware of any in-
jury" has been recognized as inherently unfair.1 0 4 Thus, the discov-
ery rule applied in occupational disease cases to overcome this
unfairness 05 is viewed by manifestation theorists as supportive of
the added litigation costs involved in determining the level of exposure in each year of the
total period and in studying the medical pathogenesis of each disease, combined with the
already staggering costs, would result in further delay to the settlement of claims. But see
Comment, supra note 3, at 691-93 (advocating a case-by-case review of the evidence). See
generally Reibstein, supra note 7, at 36, col. 4 (legal expenses exceed victim compensation).
110 See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
101 See infra notes 116-45 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17; Comment,
supra note 3, at 659.
113 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). In Kubrick, the Supreme Court
stated:
[A]lthough affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable time to
present their claims, [statutes of limitations] protect defendants and the courts
from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously
impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses,
fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.
Id.
104 See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-70 (1949); Tijsseling v. General Acci-
dent Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623, 628, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681, 684 (Ct.
App. 1976); Comment, supra note 3, at 659 n.9.
105 E.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 171 (1949) (silicosis); Wilson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (asbestosis); Clutter v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1981) (asbestosis); Karjala v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestosis); Borel v. Fibreboard
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the manifestation theory in the insurance liability context.1"6
Similarly, a type of manifestation theory has been identified in
worker's compensation cases. 10 7 The "last employer pays"'1 8 rule in
the context of worker's compensation is rooted primarily in the
strong policy of promoting administrative expediency in handling
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1101-02 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestosis); Louisville Trust Co.
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Ky. 1979) (mesotheliomia). Generally,
courts which have adopted the discovery rule in occupational disease cases have noted that
there is little difference between statutes of limitations in latent disease cases and those in
medical malpractice cases, where the statutes begin to run at a point where the injury is
reasonably discoverable. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1102;
Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 889, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113,
118 (Ct. App. 1979); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d at 499-
501.
The "discovery" rule has been adopted in several products liability cases when a period
of time has elapsed between ingestion of the product and manifestation of the injury. See,
e.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 570, 574-75 (3d Cir. 1976) (oral contra-
ceptive), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970, 971
(5th Cir. 1975) (prescription drug); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 924 (8th
Cir. 1970) (prescription drug); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776, 780 (5th
Cir. 1963) (tobacco). New York has refused to extend the discovery rule beyond the statu-
tory exceptions regarding "foreign objects" in medical malpractice cases, N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW § 214-a (McKinney 1982), and Agent Orange, id. § 214-b; see Steinhardt v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981)
(asbestosis), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2226 (1982); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d
780, 781-82, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1979). Thus, the view in New
York is that the cause of action accrues at the point of inhalation of asbestos. Steinhardt v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d at 1010, 430 N.E.2d at 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246. It has
often been urged that New York should adopt the discovery rule. See, e.g., id. at 1011, 430
N.E.2d at 1299-1300, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246-47 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); Thornton v.
Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d at 783-84, 391 N.E.2d at 1004-05, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchs-
berg, J., dissenting); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 203, commentary at 111 (McKinney 1972). Re-
cently, one New York court has held that, as to strict products liability actions in the occu-
pational-disease setting, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of discovery.
See McKee v. Johns-Manville Corp., 94 Misc. 2d 327, 331-32, 404 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (Sup.
Ct. Erie County 1978).
1o See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043; Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1220.
107 Comment, supra note 3, at 672. At times, worker's compensation cases have adopted
what could be labeled a pure manifestation or discovery approach. See Grain Handling Co.
v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir.) (occupational disease under the Longshoreman's
Compensation Act) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 570 (1939). More commonly, how-
ever, courts in such cases have adopted a modified approach under which the insurer of the
last employer prior to manifestation of the employee's injury is liable, see, e.g., General
Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 565 F.2d 208, 210-11 (2d Cir. 1977); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913 (1955), notwithstand-
ing that the disease or injury may have been the result of exposure in a prior period of
insurance coverage, see 9 G. CoucH, supra note 38, § 39:118, at 513-14 (2d ed. 1962).
108 This terminology is taken from the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Forty-Eight. See In-
surance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1221; supra note 107.
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claims in that arena.1l 9 The same policy reasons ostensibly adhere
in insurance cases.
C. The Manifestation Theory Is Supported by Traditional In-
terpretation of Insurance Contract Language
When an attempt is made to apply the manifestation theory in
cases involving insurer's liability, an additional factor, not present
in the type of cases just discussed, must be borne in mind. Over-
riding any policy considerations arising in litigation between an in-
surer and his 'insured is the presence of an insurance contract. It is
conceded, therefore, that absent some specifically articulated legis-
lative intent, the type of policy reasons underlying statute of limi-
tations and worker's compensation cases do not provide a sufficient
basis for interfering with the provisions of an insurance contract.110
Since the central purpose of an insurance contract is the allo-
cation of risk,1 the parties are certainly free to determine at what
point the liability of an insurer will attach.112 Where the insurance
contract language is clear, it obviously should be given effect, just
as the courts would enforce the terms of any other contract."13 Un-
109 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
913 (1955). In attempting to interpret the legislative intent of the worker's compensation
statute, the Travelers court highlighted the difficulty presented by the progressively devel-
oping occupational diseases and "the over-riding importance of efficient administration
.... "Id. at 145. The court came to the conclusion that the last employer prior to manifes-
tation should pay, although the possible inequities of imposing liability on the one employer
were acknowledged. Id.; see Comment, supra note 3, at 673.
110 See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043; Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1220; Commercial Union Assurance Co. v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (S.D. Ala. 1979); Tijsseling v. General Accident
Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623, 628, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681, 684 (Ct. App.
1976); Comment, supra note 3, at 674. The courts typically have recognized that the con-
cerns for efficient and expedient administration are present in the cases, but are insufficient
to override the contract. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17;
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1221.
"' See Abraham, Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expecta-
tions of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1185 (1981) ("[i]nsurance is a tool for distributing
the risk and the cost of various kinds of losses among groups of risk bearers"); see also
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 668 F.2d at 1041 ("[a]n insurance contract repre-
sents an exchange of an uncertain loss for certain loss").
112 13 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7381, at 1-11 (1976); Abraham,
supra note 111, at 1185.
113 Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 17; Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043; 13 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 112, § 7381, at 8-11;
1 G. COUCH, supra note 38, § 15:16, at 671 (2d ed. 1959) ("a contract of insurance cannot be
given an interpretation at variance with the clear.., meaning of the language in which it is
expressed").
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fortunately, the language of the contracts at issue is often quite
ambiguous.114 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the methods of in-
surance contract interpretation traditionally resorted to by the
courts support the adoption of the manifestation theory of
liability. 115
As described earlier, judicial examination of the CGL policy
involves an interpretation of when the occurrence of the injury
takes place.1 6 The historical interpretation of occurrence in the in-
surance context, focusing not upon the wrongful act, but upon the
resultant injury, lends support to the adoption of manifestation
theory. 1 7 This interpretation of occurrence has been advocated in
the context of prolonged and continued injurious exposure to haz-
ardous conditions." 8 Under such an analysis, the manifestation
concept of occurrence is not defeated by the fact that the exposure
took place during a prior policy period."'
I" The courts and the parties to asbestosis litigation disagree as to whether the policy
terms are ambiguous. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 18
(unambiguous); Michigan Chem. Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 530 F. Supp. at 154 (ambig-
uous); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1222 (inherently
ambiguous); Comment, supra note 3, at 677-78.
15 See infra notes 116-45 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
11 Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61, 62 n.14 (3d Cir. 1982)
(interpreting "occurrence" in employment discrimination suit, but refusing to speculate re-
garding application to asbestos cases); Kirkham, Michael & Assocs., Inc. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 361 F. Supp. 189, 193 (D.S.D. 1973) (architectural negligence); Tijsseling v. General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623, 626, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681, 683 (Ct.
App. 1976) (misrepresentation); 1 R. LONG, supra note 25, § 1.25, at 1-73 (1983) ("[wlhile
there may be a series of episodes, only one occurrence is intended as far as the application
of policy limits is concerned"); 2 R. LONG, supra note 25, § 11:02, at 11-12.5 (occurrence is
measured not at time of wrongful act, but at time of damage); see 11 G. COUCH, supra note
38, § 44:8, at 194; Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6, at 1150. But see M. KEIN, INSURANCE
LANGUAGE 64 (1978) (defining occurrence as "a continuous or repeated exposure to condi-
tions that results in injury or damage" (emphasis added)).
118 1 R. LONG, supra note 25, § 1.25, at 1-74 (1983) (inhalation of noxious gases); 2 R.
LONG, supra note 25, § 11.01, at 11-7, § 11.05A, at 11-23. In order for liability to attach in
continuing exposure situations, it is the injury which must occur during the policy period. 2
R. LONG, supra note 25, § 11.05A, at 11.21. Of course, once such exposure is discovered, the
policy does not cover any injuries caused by further "expected" exposure. Id. § 11.01, at 11-
7.
19 It is generally recognized that products-liability policies cover losses occurring dur-
ing the policy period, even though such losses are the result of conditions which arose prior
to the period of coverage. 11 G. COUCH, supra note 38, § 44:393, at 567. One commentator
has observed, however, that such a policy does not cover injuries occurring "after the policy
period terminates even if it arises out of work performed during the policy period." Id. §
44:8, at 195 (footnote omitted). This observation tends to militate against adoption of the
exposure theory of liability.
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The historical interpretation of occurrence is strengthened by
the fact that the CGL was amended in 1973120 to incorporate a
revised definition of occurrence 121 which reflects the requirement
that the damages, not the exposure, must align with the policy pe-
riod.122 The revision, implemented to effect a clearer statement of
the intent of the parties,123 was designed to assure coverage of
damages resulting from continuous exposure to hazardous
conditions. 24
Exposure theory proponents have frequently attempted to
avoid the precedential hurdle of traditional language interpretation
by drawing a distinction between an occurrence policy and a
claims-made policy. 125 The insured is covered under an occurrence
policy for damages arising from acts which took place during the
policy period.126 A claims-made or discovery policy, on the other
hand, provides coverage for claims which are made during the pol-
icy period "regardless of when the acts giving rise to those claims
occurred."'127 The exposure theorists argue that the CGL policy is
occurrence based, and thus, that liability is tied not to the damage
but to the underlying act.128 This mode of analysis is far from dis-
positive, however, since the CGL language has also been inter-
preted judicially as being claims-made. 29
120 See 3 R. LONG, supra note 25, at app. 53 (1983). The revised version of the CGL
took effect January 1, 1973. Id.
121 The pre-1973 definition of "occurrence" required that the accident or injurious ex-
posure take place "during the policy period." Id. at app. 59. Pursuant to the 1973 revision,
the phrase "during the policy period" was omitted from the definition of "occurrence" and
placed in the definition of "bodily injury." Id. at app. 53, 59-60.
132 Id. at app. 53.
'23 The drafters of the CGL have attempted since 1966 to write policy language in a
manner which more precisely expresses the insurer's intent regarding coverage. Id.
2I The revised definition was intended to clarify the inclusion of injuries arising from
both the sudden accident and continuous exposure situations. Id. at app. 60.
125 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 535 n.3 (1978); Brander
v. Nabors, 443 F. Supp. 764, 767 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd per curiam, 579 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1978);
Comment, supra note 12, at 245 n.48.
126 Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1982).
127 Id.
125 See Bill Binko Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Compass Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 692, 693
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); 8A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 112, § 4891.25, at 16 (1981); Com-
ment, supra note 12, at 245 n.48.
129 See Bill Binko Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Compass Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 692, 693
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Even assuming a valid distinction between occurrence and claims-
made policies, it is submitted that this distinction would not defeat the manifestation the-
ory of liability. Since occurrence traditionally has focused upon the point of damage, supra
note 117 and accompanying text, an occurrence policy could be construed to cover diseases
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D. The Policy of Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of Con-
tracting Parties Supports the Manifestation Theory
In construing insurance contracts, courts quite frequently re-
sort to the maxim of resolving ambiguities in favor of the in-
sured. 130 This has indeed been the case in asbestosis litigation 131 as
courts have sought to spread risks and to promote coverage. 32 It is
submitted, however, that application of this principle is misplaced
in the asbestosis-insurance context, where the controversy lies not
between the insurance company and the insured but among the
various insurers.133 A second maxim to which the courts have re-
sorted is honoring the reasonable expectations of the parties to a
contract.13 4 Indeed, it has been asserted that the divergent deci-
sions regarding asbestos insurer liability are reconcilable in that
each represents an attempt to "honor the parties' reasonable ex-
pectations."' s5 It appears that application of the reasonable expec-
tation doctrine is also somewhat dubious in the present context,
but in the final analysis is supportive of the manifestation theory.
The policy of honoring the expectations of contracting parties
is generally lauded in the arena of insurer liability."' Moreover,
which manifest during the time of the policy period, whereas claims-made policies would
cover claims brought within the policy period regarding diseases which were manifest in a
prior period.
130 See, e.g., 13 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 112, § 7401, at 197.
131 E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 17; Keene Corp.
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1041; Michigan Chem. Corp. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 530 F. Supp. at 154; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F.
Supp. at 1237; see Comment, supra note 3, at 679.
1382 See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
138 Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 399 F. Supp. 12, 15-16 (W.D. Pa.
1975); see Michigan Chem. Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 530 F. Supp. at 154. The appro-
priateness of applying the policy of construing ambiguities in favor of the insured in the
asbestos-litigation context is questionable. First, such preferential treatment should only be
invoked where an ambiguity actually exists. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 17 (where policy terms are unclear, construction of contract
should favor the insured); 13 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 112, § 7384, at 211-27. While the
parties may disagree regarding when the injury occurs in the context of the policy language,
such difference of opinion is not sufficient to render the policy language ambiguous. Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 678. Additionally, the use of the doctrine of favoring the insured has
been criticized in cases where the parties are of basically equal bargaining power, such as an
insurance company and a large asbestos manufacturer. Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6,
at 1159.
134 See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
18 Comment, supra note 12, at 241, 246; see Shea, supra note 25, at 578.
1S See Abraham, supra note 111, at 1153; Comment, supra note 12, at 254; see also 1
G. COUCH, supra note 38, § 15:16, at 666-71 (2d ed. 1959). Perhaps the most notable propo-
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one advantage of the doctrine is that, theoretically, it encourages
insurers to draft clearly any policy provisions that might be inter-
preted as contrary to the traditional notion of the parties' reasona-
ble expectations. 137 The advantages of the theory, nevertheless, are
questionable in the context of asbestos insurer liability, for it is
unclear whether the parties reasonably expected, with any degree
of specificity, that coverage would attach at either the point of ex-
posure or of manifestation.138 It is submitted that to assign one or
the other "expectation" not only involves excessive judicial specu-
altion, but also would likely serve to hinder an insurer's ratemak-
ing, since it would be guided by no predictable rule upon which an
insurer could anticipate liability. 139 Insofar as courts continue to
nent of the reasonable expectations doctrine was Professor Keeton, who described it as fol-
lows: "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries re-
garding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of
the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights At Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961, 967 (1970).
The doctrine arose in response to the notion that an insurance policy is basically an
adhesion contract. Comment, supra note 12, at 253; see Keeton, supra, at 966. The doctrine
has been employed in numerous insurance contract cases. See Abraham, supra note 111, at
1153 n.7; Comment, supra note 12, at 255 n.123. It should be noted, however, that the doc-
trine is generally used in cases involving consumers who, unlike the asbestos manufacturers,
lack sophisticated knowledge of insurance law. Abraham, supra note 111, at 1154.
'" The "certainty-producing effect," coupled with a desire to promote coverage, has
been a major thrust behind advocacy of the reasonable expectations doctrine. Comment,
supra note 12, at 254; see Abraham, supra note 111, at 1168; Keeton, supra note 136, at 968.
Significantly, the new CGL policy proposed by the Insurance Services Office adopts a
"claims-made" or "first discovery" approach to insurance coverage. Shea, supra note 55, at
526. if adopted, the new CGL policy would reflect an industry-wide acceptance of the mani-
festation theory of liability.
13s See Comment, supra note 12, at 255. One disadvantage of the reasonable expecta-
tions doctrine is the possibility of judicially constructed bargains that the parties never in-
tended. See id. Significantly, under the doctrine, "the construction adopted is that which a
reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood the language used
to mean." 1 G. CoucH, supra note 38, § 15:16, at 669 (2d ed.). Given that traditional insur-
ance law interpretations of the CGL policy have adopted a manifestation approach, it is not
unreasonable to think that the insured expected such an approach would be applied in cases
involving latent diseases.
139 See Comment, supra note 12, at 257. The reasonable expectations rule is particu-
larly inequitable with respect to those insurers on the risk during the periods prior to mani-
festation. The Keene court, for instance, insisted on allocating a portion of the liability to
those on the risk during exposure, and noted that a pure manifestation approach would lead
to problems of coverage. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1045-46.
The result of such an approach, however, is that the insurers on the risk during manifesta-
tion have the benefit of adjusting their rates and coverage in proportion to the risk, whereas
those insurers on the risk during prior periods are not so benefited. Notably, one court con-
fronting the issue subsequent to the Keene decision has not been persuaded by that holding.
See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 23.
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construe the reasonable expectations of the parties, however, it is
suggested that the results of this undertaking would in fact sup-
port the manifestation theory of liability. This point is illustrated
by examining the adoption of the reasonable expectations ap-
proach in the area of health and accident insurance. 10
Courts in health and accident cases tend to favor a layman's
interpretation of policy language, 141 maintaining that the manifes-
tation theory is consistent with the layman's reasonable expecta-
tions of coverage. 42 As one commentator noted:
The insured purchased health and accident insurance protection
against illness which he claims were [sic] unknown and undiscov-
ered at the time he bought the insurance. Finding that the dis-
ease or illness did not occur until after the policy was sold merely
upholds the coverage for which the insured paid a premium. 143
Courts and commentators have reasoned that this rationale is in-
appropriate in the context of insidious disease insurance because
the parties to such an insurance contract are aware of the latency
of the disease.144 It is submitted that this reasoning is misguided.
140 See, e.g., Royal Family Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 42 Ala. App. 481, 168 So. 2d 262, 264
(Civ. App. 1964); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 48 Ariz. 205, 211-12, 60 P.2d 1070,
1072 (1936); Cohen v. North Am. Life & Casualty Co., 150 Minn. 507, 508, 185 N.W. 939,
939 (1921); Kissil v. Beneficial Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 64 N.J. 555, 561, 319 A.2d 67, 70 (1974);
Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 84, 171 N.E. 914, 915 (1930) (Cardozo,
C.J.); Reiser v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 262 App. Div. 171, 173, 28 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 (1st
Dep't 1941), af'd, 289 N.Y. 561, 43 N.E.2d 534 (1942); Wenger v. Mutual Benefit Health &
Accident Ass'n, 203 N.Y.S.2d 946, 947 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960); Wilkins v. Grays Har-
bor Community Hosp., 71 Wash. 2d 178, 185, 427 P.2d 716, 719 (1967); see also Rosow &
Liederman, supra note 6, at 1156-57; Comment, supra note 3, at 670 (manifestation. theory
often applies in the area of health and accident insurance).
"I See, e.g., Cohen v. North Am. Life & Casualty Co., 150 Minn. 507, 508, 185 N.W.
939, 939 (1921); Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 84, 171 N.E. 914, 915
(1930) (Cardozo, C.J.) (disease or infirmity so characterized "in the common speech of
men"); Reiser v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 262 App. Div. 171, 173, 28 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286
(1st Dep't 1941) (interpretation of contract "must not be that of the scientist but that of the
average person"); Wenger v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 203 N.Y.S.2d 946, 947
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
142 E.g., Cohen v. North Am. Life & Casualty Co., 150 Minn. 507, 508, 185 N.W. 939,
939 (1921); Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 84, 171 N.E. 914, 915
(1930) (Cardozo, C.J.); see Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6, at 1157; Comment, supra
note 3, at 670-71. The Keene court stated that, in health insurance cases, "the security that
the policies provided would be undermined if a disease were not covered by the insurer on
the risk at the time the disease manifests itself." Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
667 F.2d at 1043 n.17 (emphasis in original).
142 Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6, at 1157.
144 See id.; Comment, supra note 3, at 671. While the courts generally have described
the health insurance cases as the most relevant of the analogies presented, see, e.g., Keene
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The manufacturer, like the individual, purchases insurance antici-
pating that it will provide coverage if the underlying risk-liability
for injuries resulting from this product-arises. The fact that a
manufacturer generally is aware that asbestosis is an insidious dis-
ease does not defeat application of the manifestation theory of cov-
erage, for a manufacturer is not aware that a particular individual
will contract asbestosis, and thus cannot be certain that a need for
the expected coverage will attach at a specific point.145
E. The Manifestation Theory and the Policy of Promoting In-
surance Coverage
1. Availability of Insurance Coverage
A final theme which is central to the judicial reasoning in in-
surance cases is the policy of attempting to promote coverage. 40
Courts and commentators favoring the exposure theory generally
have emphasized that their approach best promotes coverage, cit-
ing its ability to spread the risk among the several insurers.147
While noble in theory, their reasoning is subject to several major
caveats.
Initially, it should be noted that while the consideration of
promoting coverage in a particular case is a legitimate concern of
the court, it must always be viewed in light of the insurance con-
tract-the core of any insurance case.148 Additionally, it is sug-
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1221, these cases nonetheless have been considered dis-
tinguishable from the liability insurance cases, see Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
667 F.2d at 1043; Rosow & Liederman, supra note 6, at 1157; Comment, supra note 3, at
671. One commentator observed: "It cannot be said that the manufacturer of a product that
poses an insidious hazard to the health of others is truly unaware that the damages for
which he may be found liable arose out of bodily injury that remained latent for some
time." Comment, supra note 3, at 671.
15 Cf. 2 R. LONG, supra note 25, § 11.05A, at 11-20 (expecting "signifies more than a
bare hope and embraces a high degree of certainty that a thing is about to happen").
146 See 682 F.2d at 2; Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1041; Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1219; Shea, supra note 25, at
578 (cases consistent in favoring greatest amount of available coverage).
"4 See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. at 1242-
43. The exposure theory "tends to allocate liability widely among insurers and reduce the
difficulty experienced by manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of asbestos and other
products in obtaining current coverage." Shea, supra note 25, at 578; see Mansfield, supra
note 1, at 877 (exposure theory spreads losses over a number of years); Insurer's Duty,
supra note 19, at 1099.
14 See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1225.
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gested that the exposure theory may place liability on insurers who
are insolvent or nonexistent at the time of manifestation. The
manifestation theory is attractive in this regard since it ties cur-
rent risks with current rates, thus increasing the likelihood of
available coverage. 149 While the manifestation theory has been crit-
icized as allowing insurers to whom premiums were paid during the
time of exposure to escape responsibility,150 it is submitted that
such insurers fulfilled their obligation in regard to these premiums
by standing ready, willing and able to pay any good faith claims
that might arise at a point of manifestation occurring while they
were on the risk.
Judicial acceptance of the manifestation theory of liability
would, however, be attended by the risk that following manifesta-
tion of a sufficient number of cases of asbestosis, insurance compa-
nies will increase their rates dramatically,' will underwrite poli-
cies only with large deductibles, 15 2 or will discontinue coverage in
the area altogether, leaving manufacturers virtually uninsured for
future claims. 53 While the potential ultimate effects of the mani-
",9 See Mansfield, supra note 1, at 876. Since the manifestation theory places "losses
attributable to the underlying cases in more recent policy years," it serves to keep current
the loss structure for rate-making, with premiums increasing to compensate for the losses.
Id.
150 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 513 F. Supp. at 50.
'6 See, e.g., id. at 51; Mansfield, supra note 1, at 876; Insurer's Duty, supra note 19, at
1097. But cf. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 656 (effect of assigning liability to large
number of insurers in products liability cases would be an increase in costs, or the unavaila-
bility of insurance).
152 See Mansfield, supra note 1, at 876; Insurer's Duty, supra note 19, at 1097. In 1976,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company instituted a $100,000 per person deductible amount for
their asbestosis policies. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
at 1215 n.6.
151 See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1219;
Mansfield, supra note 1, at 876; Casenote, supra note 23, at 1142; Insurer's Duty, supra
note 19, at 1097. A current scarcity exists in the availability of products liability insurance
for manufacturers in certain high-risk industries. Casenote, supra note 23, at 1142.
One dramatic response to this problem of asbestos manufacturers being left uninsured
is the recent filing for protection under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy law by UNR
Industries, see Lewin, UNR Industries Files for Chapter 11, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1982, at
D1, col. 3, and by Johns-Manville, see Feder, Manville Submits Bankruptcy Filing to Halt
Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6. The bankruptcy filings have the potential
effect of staying asbestos litigation not only against the two companies, but against other
codefendants as well. Winter, Bankruptcies Create Asbestos Case Turmoil, 68 A.B.A. J.
1361 (1982); see Lewin, supra, at D12, col. 5. It has been suggested that this resort by asbes-
tos manufacturers to the protection of the bankruptcy courts illustrates the need for a legis-
lative response to the asbestosis-victim compensation problem. Miller, Asbestos Legislation:
Who Compensates the Victims? Don't Let Industry Shirk Its Duty, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
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festation theory are of significant concern both to the parties and
to society at large, it is submitted that these possible effects do not
justify a substantial break with precedent by the courts, whose
function is to interpret a particular contract in a particular case so
as to settle a grievance between the parties. Indeed, any attempts
at a far-reaching restructuring of the insurance industry's response
to asbestosis claims would seem to lie within the function of the
legislature, not the judiciary.
2. The Legislative Response
A number of legislative bills already have been introduced to
deal with the problem of asbestosis claims."" Most of these bills,
patterned after the Black-Lung legislation, 155 deal primarily with
1982, § III, at 2, col. 3; Feder, supra, at D4, col. 1; Lewin, The Legal Issues in Manville's
Move, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 2; Noble, Asbestos Claimants Angered by
Filing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, col. 5. Indeed, several commentators, noting that a
judicial resolution of the asbestos problem is infeasible both from the standpoint of crowded
court dockets and from that of litigation costs to the parties, have urged the legislature to
provide relief. See, e.g., Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 351-52; Shea, supra note 25, at 578;
Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 648, 656-57; Winter, supra note 1, at 398-99; Comment,
supra note 12, at 255; see also Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th Cir.
1981) (new approaches to asbestosis, whether judicial or legislative, urgently needed); Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1229 (Merritt, J., dissenting)
(issue deserves legislative resolution).
Other proposed solutions to the caseload problem include the use of arbitration, class
actions and the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See 662 F.2d at 1189; Winter, supra note 1,
at 397-98. The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been employed in an increasing number of
products liability suits. Wheeler & Allee, Collateral Estoppel in Products Liability Cases,
Nat'l L.J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 15, col. 3 (describing use of doctrine in asbestos and DES cases).
The use of the doctrine in the asbestos context increased drastically following the Borel
decision. See id. at 17, col. 2; supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Application of
collateral estoppel in products liability cases frequently has been criticized, however. Mans-
field, supra note 1, at 869; Wheeler & Allee, supra, at 19, cols. 3-4. The urgent need for
legislative action is made even more acute by the Supreme Court's consistent denial of certi-
orari in the asbestosis cases. See supra note 88.
14 See H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Occupational Health Hazards Compen-
sation Act of 1982, proposed by Rep. Miller); S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Asbestos
Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1981, proposed by Sen. Hart); H.R. 5224, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) (Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act, proposed by Rep. Fenwick).
See generally Mansfield, supra note 1, at 870; Winter, supra note 1, at 398.
155 See Mansfield, supra note 1, at 870; Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 351. In 1969, Con-
gress passed legislation providing for benefits for coal miners suffering from pneumoconiosis,
or "black lung disease." See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969). See generally De Carlo & Vieweg, Federal Black Lung Law and
Insurance In a Nutshell, 11 FORUM 661, 662-65 (1976); Kelly, Black Lung Benefit Trusts As
A Federal Self-Insurance Alternative, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 847, 847-50 (1980).
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worker's compensation-type claims and employer's liability.15 6
Since the legislation does not serve to bar any causes of action in
products liability,157 the courts are left with a proliferation of suits
on the products liability side and the unresolved problem of insur-
ers' liability.158
Faced with this situation, it is submitted that Congress must
respond by enacting a legislative scheme that will enable products-
liability insurers to satisfy claims and still provide adequate cover-
age for the respective manufacturers. 59 Although legislative limita-
tions on tort liability may be the ultimate solution in this area,6 0
' See Mansfield, supra note 1, at 870; Winter, supra note 1, at 398. The bill proposed
by Representative Miller proffers a system of compulsory coverage of all employers and
employees in cases involving exposure to asbestos or uranium ore. The bill provides for a
schedule of benefit payments and establishes compensation under the Act as the exclusive
remedy against the employer. See Occupational Health Hazard Compensation Act of 1982,
H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-1i, 22 (1982). The Fenwick and Hart bills, similarly, are
structured along worker's compensation lines, although the bills extend coverage to nonem-
ployees such as household members. See H.R. 5224, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981); S. 1643,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 CONG. REC. S10034 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981).
I" See, e.g., H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-25 (1982); Winter, supra note 1, at 398.
10 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The flood of asbestos-related litigation is
expected to increase over the next few decades. See Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 350; Vagley &
Blanton, supra note 1, at 647. It is predicted that approximately 20,000 workers will die
annually from asbestos exposure. See Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 350; Vagley & Blanton,
supra note 1, at 647. Cases involving new classes of victims continue to arise, Mehaffy,
supra note 1, at 350-51 (members of households or the general public), and hazards still
exist from new products, as well as from a re-release into the atmosphere of asbestos fibers
when asbestos-containing products are removed or destroyed, id. at 351. Moreover, it is esti-
mated that payments of damages for asbestos exposure during the period from 1977 to 1995
will range from $9.3 to $25.6 billion. Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 647.
'" The seemingly limitless liability that has been imposed upon manufacturers as a
result of products liability litigation in general has provoked much discussion regarding a
system of national products liability legislation. See, e.g., INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT, reprinted in 5 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28,
at app. 585, [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]; O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning
Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv.
501, 529 (1976); Sandler, Strict Liability and the Need for Legislation, 53 VA. L. REv. 1509,
1513 (1967); Shea, supra note 25, at 578-79; Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 656-57. It
has been suggested that legislation in this area would offer the advantages of availability of
adequate and affordable insurance coverage, and of uniform standards by which manufac-
turers could measure the desirability of new methods and products. See Model Uniform
Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,714-715 (1979); Shea, supra note 25, at 579;
Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 656-57.
160 See, e.g., 8D J. APPLEMAN, supra note 112, § 5152, at 378-79 (1981). While legislative
limitations on tort liability are rarely favored, they have been deemed necessary at times in
order to redress the claims of all victims. One particularly appropriate example of a justifia-
ble limitation on tort liability is the scheme of no-fault insurance adopted by most states in
the area of automobile insurance. See id. This legislative abolition of a common-law right of
action has withstood constitutional and other challenges in the courts. See Pinnick v.
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Congress currently needs to address the feasibility of programs
designed to enable insurers to continue underwriting asbestosis in-
surance, such as federal reinsurance systems,8 1 or pooling arrange-
ments162 funded by contributions from manufacturers, insurers,
consumers,163 and the government itself.164 Absent legislation di-
Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 13, 271 N.E.2d 592, 599-600 (1971); 8D J. APPLEMAN, supra note 112, §
5153, at 378-79 (1981).
One commentator has urged the adoption of a no-fault compensation-type scheme of
insurance in the products liability arena, whereby a manufacturer who elected to proceed
under the system would pay, regardless of fault, the out-of-pocket losses and medical ex-
penses of the victims. See J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJuRY 97-98 (1975). Pain and
suffering and psychic loss would not be compensable. Id; see Note, Industry Wide Liability,
13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980, 1020 (1979). Although such a system would limit the amount
received by each victim, it would have the effect of increasing the total payout to all victims,
since litigation expenses incurred under the current system would be avoided. See J.
O'CONNELL, supra at 98; O'Connell, supra note 159, at 540. For this reason, the proposal
generally is favored by consumer groups. O'Connell, supra note 159, at 531.
"1' See FINAL REPORT, supra note 159, at app. 1171. Reinsurance is defined as "insur-
ance purchased by an insurance company to transfer a portion of its liability to other insur-
ers." Id. at app. 1171-72. Since the federal government would not be in the business to make
a profit, it could offer such insurance at lower rates, hopefully lowering the primary insur-
ance rates and increasing coverage. Id. at app. 1173-74. The interagency task force favored
the reinsurance approach over such mechanisms as direct federal insurance, mandatory
pooling, and assigned risk plans. Id. at app. 1172, 1179.
162 Insurance pooling arrangements have long been recognized as a means of efficiently
spreading the risk of insurance and reducing administrative costs. FINAL REPORT, supra note
159, at app. 1155-56 (there is "security in numbers"). Thus, such pools serve to reduce in-
surance costs in that they allow an insurer to "be less conservative in the ratemaking pro-
cess." Id. at app. 1142. Voluntary pooling arrangements, long used in the aircraft industry,
are favored. Id. at app. 1157-58. Where insurers do not voluntarily enter such agreements,
however, it has been recommended that Congress consider enacting mandatory pooling sys-
tems as a short-term solution for industries suffering from lack of availability of coverage.
Id. at app. 1163-68.
Pooling arrangements have been proposed to fund several of the asbestosis compensa-
tion schemes currently under study. See, e.g., H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-39 (1982);
H.R. 5224, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-21 (1981). Such arrangements have been urged by sev-
eral commentators in this and other products liability compensation contexts. See Adam,
Proper Compensation For the Damaged Worker, 330 ANNALS N.Y. AcA. Sci. 597, 599
(1979); Lanzone, Asbestos Litigation: Common Sense or Common Disaster, 54 N.Y.S.B.J.
24, 26 (1982); Sandier, supra note 159, at 1516; Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 657;
Note, supra note 160, at 120-21; Lewin, Asbestos Now Company Peril, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
1982, at D2, col. 2.
163 See Sandier, supra note 159, at 1516. Contributions to the asbestosis compensation
fund should also be sought from those entities that purchased large quantities of asbestos
products for industrial use, such as major builders or manufacturers who incorporate the
products into their own products. Such consumer contributions have heretofore been urged
in the context of other products liability compensation schemes. See id. (urging that a "sales
tax" method of loss spreading be adopted); Note, supra note 160, at 1020 n.211. It has been
suggested that such consumer contributions to the compensation system will encourage con-
sumers to gravitate to the safer products which have a correspondingly lower "tax rate." See
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rected at products liability insurance in general,"6 5 it appears that
narrowly drawn legislative action would be the penultimate solu-
tion to the problem of asbestos-insurer liability, or at least an ef-
fective supplement to judicial application of the manifestation
theory.16 6
Sandler, supra note 159, at 1516.
'l It has been urged that the government share in the responsibility of compensating
claims due to asbestos-related injuries. See, e.g., Shabecoff, Asbestos Makers Press U.S. to
Do More in Liability Cases, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1983, at Al, cols. 1-2; Winter, supra note
1, at 399. Such a proposal is based upon the recognition that the government was a major
consumer of asbestos products used in shipbuilding during the World War II era. See, e.g.,
Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 637; Shabecoff, supra, at Al, col. 1, B8, col. 1.
165 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. As to insidious disease cases of first
impression which may arise in the future, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, legisla-
tive resolution, although prospectively necessary, may be premature at the present time, see
Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 351. Hence, although it has been recognized that similar difficul-
ties of victim compensation are likely to occur in future insidious disease contexts, Nader,
Conclusion: We Are Not Helpless, in WHO's POISONING AMERICA, supra note 61, at 341, and
that legislative compensation systems for the prospective victims of such injuries are already
being proffered, see id. at 343; ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH, supra note 6, at 122-24, commen-
tators have advocated the postponement of legislative actions until such situations arise,
see, e.g., Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 351. Indeed, a legislative scheme which is appropriate in
the asbestosis context may not be appropriate to litigation involving other diseases. For
example, the worker's compensation considerations, and the proposed legislation based on
such claims, which must be considered regarding the insidious diseases arising in the occu-
pational setting, are inapplicable to cases involving drugs such as DES, which constitute
pure products liability claims. See Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 639. Moreover, it has
been noted that the insurance industry itself can avoid confusion as to the point of injury in
other contexts by clearly drafting the policy language "to provide coverage at a point in time
suitable to the insurer." 3A L. FR MER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, § 50.01C[4], at 19-
60.12; see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
The prematurity of such legislation is bolstered by the notion that future insidious dis-
eases may not produce the volume of litigation that asbestosis has. See Vagley & Blanton,
supra note 1, at 647; supra note 8 and accompanying text. While limiting legislation to one
particular product may seem inequitable, it has been noted in defense that the unique na-
ture of the asbestosis experience justifies a solitary abandonment of traditional tort con-
cepts. See Mehaffy, supra note 1, at 351. But see Vagley & Blanton, supra note 1, at 657
(urging legislative and administrative solutions for all "occupational diseases and cumula-
tive trauma injuries").
"' While a legislative approach must remain effective for as long as required to allevi-
ate the problem, it is generally preferred that such interference be, if possible, a short-term
remedy. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 159, at app. 1179. It is recognized that any legislative
action implemented would have no effect on causes of actions which have previously ac-
crued. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 13, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (1971); 8D J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 112, § 5152, at 378 (1981). By adopting the manifestation theory of liability,
however, this problem is avoided in the asbestos context, since all causes of action will not
accrue until the diseases manifest.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is recognized that there are no simplistic solutions to the
problem of insurers' liability for asbestosis claims. The manifesta-
tion theory of liability, however, apparently provides the most
workable solution in handling these suits. Combined with the nec-
essary congressional action, designed to address the problems pe-
culiar to the asbestosis crisis, such a solution should serve to ac-
complish the ultimate concern of the courts and the
legislature-the timely and expeditious resolution of the claims of
asbestosis victims.
Kevin C. Logue
